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I. INTRODUCTION: APRÈS LA DELUGE C’EST NOUS?
I have always maintained that there was not much wrong with the global
economy until the financial industry torpedoed it. I have also posited that because of
this, the recovery of the global economy, including in Europe, would be faster and
stronger for the very same reason. However, the road to full recovery is not going to
be smooth, and things are never going to be quite the same ever again. Indeed, there
are going to be significant long-term changes.
It is now over two years since the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy filing by
Lehman Brothers sent shockwaves through an already tremulous and jittery financial
and political world. In the dark days of the ensuing months, in the United States
(U.S.), in Britain and Europe, and in many other parts of the world, markets crashed
or severely slumped, commercial and investment banks failed, credit froze, trade and
commerce slowed dramatically, profits evaporated, businesses tightened belts, and
unemployment figures skyrocketed.1 In most major economic zones, including the

* Bruce Lowe is a partner in the Cleveland, Ohio, office of Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP.
He is a Barrister-at-law of the Middle Temple, London, England, and was educated at St.
Edmund Hall, Oxford University, gaining a B.A. and M.A. Degrees in Modern History. He is
President of the Henry T. King, Jr. Greater Cleveland International Lawyers Group and a cofounder and Board Chair of the British-American Chamber of Commerce of Ohio. Bruce
would also like to thank Jerry J. Torma, Director, International Human Resources, Nordson
Corporation, for providing a stream of helpful source information for certain aspects of this
article.
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U.S. and Europe, governments and central banks, often in consultation with each
other over appropriate courses of action, stepped in with packages of bailout
measures of various kinds, usually involving substantial loans to shore up credit at
major banking institutions, as well as a potpourri of other initiatives aimed at
providing public sector relief to private financial and commercial institutions and
businesses.2
More than two years later, with the benefit of hindsight, the measures appear to
have worked in large part. The floodwaters of financial catastrophe have
substantially receded, and, while the many scars are evident, and much clean-up
work remains to be done, the global financial scene looks a lot brighter, as do the
prospects for international business generally.
•
•
•
•

•

Major banks are better capitalized, and some are even doing rather well;
New credit has not yet really loosened up, but this will happen in time;
Existing credit has tightened and become more expensive, but this was
probably inevitable at some point anyway;
Interest rates have remained generally under control, stock markets have
at least partially recovered, merger and acquisition activity has resumed,
and commercial markets, particularly China, (with a predicted 9% GDP
growth rate for 2010) are visibly strong and thriving again; and
Most of the riskier practices that contributed to the mess have been
curtailed or stopped - subprime mortgages, high risk hedge funds, credit
derivatives, etc.

In sum, both in the U.S. and in Europe, the financial crisis is for the most part
over, and the challenge now is to fuel the recovery at the same time as addressing
critical vulnerabilities which became apparent as a result of the pressures created by
the financial meltdown.
II. EUROPE: THE CHALLENGES ON THE REBOUND
What I believe has now become apparent is that, with respect to Europe, there are
now at least three major challenges for the financial world which were not really
there before--or at least not as sharply in focus. How the governments and fiscal
advisory groups in Europe (and, for that matter, around the world) address these
issues will have much to do not only with the pace and strength of the ongoing
global economic recovery, but also with Europe’s and the world’s collective abilities
to control and avert future fiscal crises.
A. Europe’s Three Big Questions
The first of these challenges is how to reform and regulate the financial and
banking system going forward in order to minimize the recurrence of another such
crisis. So much taxpayer money has been pumped into the financial system, there
now has to be a new heightened level of coordination with and accountability on the
part of the financial and banking system to governments on fiscal policy matters to a
greater extent than existed before September 2008.
1

See Unnatural Selection, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2009 at 15, available at http://www
.economist.com/node/14416804.
2

Id.
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The second challenge, for Europe at least, is "how to marry Europe’s crossborder single market for finance with the reality that only national governments can
and will step in when things go wrong."3 As the current Greek crisis has exposed,
there is an absence of a defined European Union (EU) framework for addressing a
financial crisis in a particular country. While the EU is a financial zone for purposes
of fiscal policy governance, national governments have had to act separately when
necessary, and there has been a well-publicized divergence among major members
of the EU about how to deal with such crises. There is no EU governance protocol
for the members to follow as a path to resolving such problems.
The third of these challenges is a broader and more long-term concern which
would have had to have been faced by the major EU nations regardless of any
economic crisis, but which has become visibly more apparent as an imminent hurdle
because of the 2008 financial crisis. This is the problem of maintaining
competitiveness as a major industrialized group of nations and economies when their
core populations are aging, numbers overall are declining, and emerging powers
such as China and Brazil, with growing and more youthful skilled worker
populations, are increasingly vying for commercial and cultural dominance.
I will return to these questions shortly, but first, a little more about the events of
September 2008, the prelude to those events, and the aftermath.
III. EUROPE BEFORE THE CRISIS
“The most important liberal rules of the international financial system-those of the EU and OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development]--were conceived and authored by Europeans, not by
U.S. policy makers.”4
Europe has had financial crises in the past. Examples of this include the German
Creditanstalt (Standstill Agreement) of 1931, multiple devaluations (France in 1926,
1958, and 1969; Britain in 1940, 1949, and 1967), gold standard joinders and
abandonments (Britain in 1931, 1960, and 1968).5 However, an increasing general
awareness of the desirability of a cross-border monetary system straddled World
War II, and from a post-war European perspective was only further inspired by the
international agreements reached in the United States in 1944 at Bretton Woods, at
which time the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were first
established.6

3
Germany's Oddly Vapid Election, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2009, at 54, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/14402188.
4

Ann Cullen, How Europe Wrote the Rules of Global Finance: Q&A with Rawi Abdelal,
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Aug. 21, 2006, available at http://
hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5475.html.
5
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 10-11 (Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed. 1993).
6

HORST UNGERER, A CONCISE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTERPRETATION: FROM
EPU TO EMU, 15-23 (Quorum Books 1997).
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In his comprehensive analysis of European economic banking and evolution,7
Professor Charles Kindleberger in the introduction lists as the twelfth and perhaps
most fundamentally important issue historically affecting monetary evolution:
“(12) The capacity of societies – economies, nations, governments – to
adapt to change and to innovate by creating new financial institutions to
meet new problems.”8
While the concept of European financial unification is an old one, Kindleberger
pointed to the United States’ Marshall Plan as providing a post-war boost towards
turning the concept into reality.9 The Marshall Plan was legislated into existence in
the 1948 Economic Cooperation Act, and the Congressional preamble to the Act
specifically encouraged Europe to follow the Americans in forming a continentalwide economic market.10 Post-war France also started several initiatives towards
various forms of “functional integration,” implementing economic cooperation
between countries in areas such as transportation, industrial production, and customs
union.11 These initiatives came together in the landmark Treaty of Rome of 1957,
which formed the European Economic Community (“EEC”), including Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy and The Netherlands.12 The Rome Treaty
called for a customs union among the members, freedom of movement of labor and
capital, a European Investment Bank, and a fund for assisting economic development
in former colonies of the member nations.13
The British initially rejected an invitation to join the EEC and formed an
organization of the peripheral countries to the EEC, primarily because of Britain’s
perceived closer relationship with the United States and its significant trading
relationships with its Commonwealth countries.14 Eventually, however, the
attractiveness of the European relationship became clearer, and by 1963 Britain was
applying to join the Common Market, but (largely thanks to the famous “Non” of
President De Gaulle) did not gain membership until 1973, when it was admitted
along with Denmark and Ireland.15 Thereafter, the EEC continued the process of
instilling free trade principles within the Common Market, and effectuating a more
complete economic integration. In addition to removal of tariffs and customs, the
process involved standardization in areas such as taxation, food and drug laws,
interest rates for capital, equalization of wages and salaries, and employment laws.16

7

KINDLEBERGER, supra note 5.

8

Id. at 7.

9

Id. at 447.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 447-48.

14

Id. at 448.

15

Id.

16

Id.
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As economic integration progressed, the development of financial and currency
integration inevitably followed suit.17
A. European Monetary Integration
Nowadays, after virtually a decade of experiencing a common European
currency, we can understand its importance, not only to European unity but also in
the broader context of world economic globalization. Thirty years ago, thoughtful
economists saw common currency as a pivotal aspect of the overall movement
towards globalization. An articulated vision in this vein by a fellow economist was
included by Professor Kindleberger at the outset of his chapter on European financial
integration:
Every person must see that the demand for uniformity in currency is only
one case of the growing demand for uniformity in matters between
nations really similar. Many subjects, most subjects of legislation, vary
between nation and nation; they depend on national association and
peculiar idiosyncracy and other causes. But commerce is everywhere
identical; buying and selling, lending and borrowing, are alike all the
world over, and all matters concerning them ought universally to be alike
too. (Bagehot, A Universal Money, Collected Works, 1868 [1978], Vol.
11, p. 65).18
Fueled by burgeoning sentiments generally for economic unification, as well as
the ongoing weakness of the dollar at that time, from the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Europe moved in stages towards the installation of a common currency.19 First, the
EEC Commission in 1969 established a group of experts (the “Werner Group”) to
study and recommend a plan for achieving economic and monetary union.20 This led
eventually to the establishment of the European Monetary System (“EMS”) in 1979,
the introduction of the initial common currency concept, the ECU (the European
Currency Unit), and ultimately, in 1981, the European Monetary Fund (“EMF”) as
the repository for the anticipated common currency.21 Eventually, with the Maastricht Treaty,22 the formation of the European Union (EU) in 1992,23 and several rounds
of additional accession, culminating in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, full European
economic and market integration became a permanent reality.24 As a cornerstone
17

Id. at 454.

18

Id. at 447 (quoting Walter Bagehot, A Universal Money, in COLLECTED WORKS VOL. 11
65 (1978)).
19
Kathleen Burk, Money and Power: The Shift from Great Britain to the United States, in
FINANCE AND FINANCIERS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 1880-1960 365 (Youssef Cassis ed., 1992).
20

UNGERER, supra note 6, at 97-118.

21

See generally UNGERER, supra note 6 (containing a detailed discussion of European
integrated monetary development during the '60s, '70s and '80s).
22

Id. at 219-256.

23

Id. at 243-292.

24

See European Integration, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, http://www.ecb.int/ecb/
educational/facts/euint/html/ei_001.en.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2010).

88

GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:83

aspect of the process, European monetary integration kept pace, with the creation of
the European Central Bank ("ECB") pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty, and the
launch of the Euro as a common currency among eleven member countries in 1999.25
Today, the EU (also sometimes referred to, both elsewhere and in this article as
the "euro-zone" or "euro group") has twenty-seven member states, of which at least
sixteen have adopted the Euro as their national currency. The EU states are well
served by a coordinated banking and monetary system. Within that system, the
European System of Central Banks (“ECSB”) attempts to guide all of the member
nations collectively pursuant to principles of monetary policy, arriving at price
stability within the EU. At the same time, the ECB watches over the coordinated
banking, finance, and monetary policy needs of the Euro member states.26
IV. SEPTEMBER 2008: MEETING THE CHALLENGE
There is no doubt that the existence of this established framework helped
facilitate quick and decisive action in September 2008. Within approximately 24
hours after the Lehman bankruptcy news sent shock waves across the world, the
ECB, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan had together pumped over 111.7
billion euro (approximately 159.3 billion in U.S. dollars) in quick tenders out to
commercial banks, in order to try to prevent liquidity shortfalls, prevent a credit
freeze at some of the world’s biggest banks, and bolster confidence (the ECB alone
contributed 70 billion euro of this).27
This process continued for some time, and by the time the dust settled,
approximately 2.7 trillion euro (over $4 trillion in U.S. dollars) had been advanced
from central banks worldwide in loans and debt guarantees, mainly to the larger
commercial banks in their respective countries or regions.28 That same day, the
British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, told the BBC, “[g]overnments,
central banks and regulators have made it clear that we will do everything we
possibly can to maintain stability in the financial system (international cooperation is
crucial to ensuring financial stability). This is clearly a very difficult time. We need
to take action internationally, and we are.”29
More than eighteen months later, this strong intervention by governments still
"looks like the right call."30 The crisis wave receded and, with Europe and the world
headed into a broad and deep recession, the economic distress and damage could
have been much worse otherwise.31
25

UNGERER, supra note 6, at 209-292.

26

For helpful information on the ESCB and ECB on the European Central Bank's website,
see Organisation, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/
html/or_001.en.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2010).
27
European Central Bank Pumps €70 Billion Into Market, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,578540,00.html.
28

Unnatural Selection, supra note 1, at 15.

29

Id. (quoting Interview by BBC with Alistair Darling, British Chancellor of the
Exchequer, in London, Eng. (Sept. 13, 2008)).
30

Id.

31

Id.
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As the primary driving force behind these strong, swift initiatives, Gordon
Brown, the British Prime Minister, earned widespread kudos at this time, as well as
the respect of EU finance ministers and major EU leaders such as German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. They have since
continued to respect his work and understanding of finance and banking systems
issues—an area in which he is clearly much more comfortable than most others. It
was indeed one of his better moments. His stabilization models -- usually including
the installation of tighter lending terms (especially with respect to British banks), the
creation of asset protection schemes, and temporary bailouts via government interim
acquisition of equity interests (with reversion to private ownership expected as soon
as stabilization is achieved) − have been viewed as quite effective.32 Unfortunately
for Mr. Brown, as discussed more fully below, it was not enough to save his job.
Much of Europe has weathered the storm in relatively decent shape. I have had
the chance to listen to presentations by several European economists during the last
part of 2009 and early 2010, − all prior to the Greek crisis, I should add, and they all
tended to come down somewhere between guarded optimism and repressed
pessimism in their overviews and forecasts.33 The main reason underlying the
relative optimism was, I believe, the feeling that the global economy would
generally continue to rebound, and that the financial industry would not drag it down
like before. Since then, fresh economic crises have plagued countries such as Greece
and Spain in recent months, and undeniably serious fallout effects have resulted,
particularly impacting the rest of the EU and dampening general recovery hopes and
optimism from time to time. However, the overall impact has been more to temper
the optimism somewhat, to spawn intermittent fears of a "double-dip," and perhaps
to lengthen the forecasted recovery timeframes, rather than to see any longer term
and fundamental impairment of rebound and recovery prospects generally.34
V. EUROPE: COMING OUT OF THE CRASH
In the aftermath of the crisis, most of the original major EU members have come
through reasonably well; Germany especially, where Angela Merkel, in her
successful autumn 2009 re-election campaign, was able to point to the economic
crisis as having proved the superiority of Germany’s post-war “social market
economic” model.35 In France, Holland, and most Scandinavian countries too,
governments implemented a variety of stabilization packages helping to restore
equilibrium and confidence. In most instances, including in Germany and France,
this included restructuring and insolvency measures aimed to provide a greater

32
For a compelling account of Gordon Brown's handling of the crisis, see George Parker,
His Finest Moment, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at 9.
33

See, e.g., STEPHAN RAES, HEAD OF ECON. DEP’T, ROYAL NETHERLANDS EMBASSY,
PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN RECOVERY (2009). See also Roger Bootle, The Economic and
Financial Outlook, CAPITAL ECONOMICS, Presentation at the Interlex Annual Conference
(Sept. 2009).
34
35

Chris Giles, Vulnerable to Vertigo, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 28, 2010, at 5.

See Daniel Shafer, On a Roll, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at 7. See also Stanley
Pignal, Eurozone Divided as Germany Speeds On, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at 2.
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flexibility of options to challenged or troubled businesses.36 In Germany, the
insolvency laws now include a procedure which is probably as close to a U.S.-style
Chapter 11 as any jurisdiction outside of the United States, i.e., permitting a debtor
to remain in possession and operation of its assets and business, under court
supervision but without the supervisory control of a court appointed receiver or
trustee, while the business is reorganized.37
There remain substantial challenges, such as for Greece and Spain, but of the
“big dogs” of Europe, it is the United Kingdom − ironically, given Gordon Brown’s
crisis leadership − which is the one with ostensibly the most problems. Interestingly,
however, perhaps it is the country now perhaps doing the most to redress those
problems.
A. The United Kingdom in 2010
For much of the first decade of the 21st century, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown
chortled about how Britain’s open trade system and robust economy was outpacing
the more tightly regulated and steady continental nations. In September 2008,
however, nowhere in Europe (except possibly for Iceland and Ireland) was more
sharply affected by the 2008 financial crisis. Britain had already had the Northern
Rock Bank failure and rescue as a portent of things to come, and in September 2008,
no other financial system came as close to collapsing. I recall flying into Heathrow
one morning in mid-December 2008, and watching a TV monitor in the airport
announcing that Woolworth’s was closing its door forever. While the Woolworth’s
name disappeared from U.S. high street decades ago, in the U.K. Woolworth’s had
been a prominent fixture in every British town high street since the early 20th
century. As a symbol of crisis, it was even more impactful than if, in the U.S., Sears
Roebuck were to announce its closing. A venerable old retailer−you wouldn’t be
entirely surprised, but it would be significant.
Now, Britain is faced with a spending deficit that approaches 13% of GDP—
(projected at 175 billion euro for 2010), far higher than any other G20 country.38
•
•
•
•

Between early 2008 and the fall of 2009, its GDP shrank 6.2%;
Its recession lasted for six quarters—longer than any other G7 economy;
Government borrowing as a share of GDP is forecasted by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be the highest of any G20 nation
in 2010; and
Government spending as a share of GDP in 2009 was 52%--higher even
than Germany’s 48%--BUT, the statist German financial model is based
upon a more extensive framework of governmental support and
provides it more efficiently.39

36

Anouska Sakoui, Distressed Groups Put New Laws to the Test, FINANCIAL TIMES, June
22, 2009, at 4.
37

Germany’s Oddly Vapid Election, supra note 3, at 54; see also, Sakoui, supra note 36, at

38

George Parker, Choice Cuts, FINANCIAL TIMES ANALYSIS, September 14, 2009 at 7.

39

Out of the Ruins, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2010, at 14; Parker, supra note 38.

1.
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There have been murmurings of the notorious 1970’s “sick man of Europe”
phrase again. In those final pre-Thatcher years of old Labour, Britain was hamstrung
by economic stagnation, double digit inflation, and rampant strikes and industrial
unrest. A recent Financial Times article harkened back to those times and recalled
the labor unrest of that era, and a famous quote from the advisor (Bernard
Donoughue) to Prime Minister James Callaghan at the time, in his diary:
“Apparently the British, never very keen on hard work, have decided on
permanent inactivity. The Anglo-Saxons are normally very sensible, but when they
go mad they go completely barmy.”40

41

Gordon Brown largely had only himself to blame for all of this, and he was
always likely to suffer at the polls accordingly. Years of widely-termed “profligate”
spending on his watch, coupled with extending a creeping net of indirect taxation in
new and creative ways, had much to do with why Britain is in its current
predicament. The income-earning taxpayers were the ones squeezed most, and they
had their say on May 6th, 2010 in the U.K. General Election.

40

Brian Groom, A Heap of Difference, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 19, 2010, at 8.

41

Reproduced by kind permission of The Spectator, and Michael Heath.
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42

All that being said, the picture for Britain going forward may not be all that bad:
•
•

It is still the world’s sixth largest manufacturing economy;43
It still has its fully open trade approach, which gives it optimum ability
to take advantage of the global economic rebound;44

42
Reproduced by kind permission of Express Newspapers Ltd. and Paul Thomas. See also
http://www.paulthomascartoons.co.uk.
43

Out of the Ruins, supra note 39, at 14.

44
The importance of embracing free trade and taking a controlling role in all of its aspects
may well overshadow more traditional measures of prosperity, such as where manufacturing
occurs. Lord Jones of Birmingham, former chair of the Confederation of British Industries
(“CBI”) and a non-partisan minister in Gordon Brown’s cabinet for trade development
purposes, in warning against the temptations of protectionism and espousing the maintenance
of free-market ideals, likes to tell a story, particularly for his American audiences, of two
people chatting at a club or pub. One has a Dumbledore doll, of Harry Potter fame, with a
“Made in China” stamp on the base, which he had purchased at TESCO for £9.99 [euro].
They commiserate that this shows that the West is losing the commercial battle, but, Jones
says, think about where that £9.99 is going. He then proceeds to enumerate a breakdown: £5
to TESCO, encompassing its shareholders and employees, £2 to logistics and transportation
costs, £1 to marketing and advertising costs, £1 to J. K. Rowling and her publishers. Only £1
actually goes to China. The lesson here, according to Jones, is to stay on the cutting edge, be
the creators and innovators, the marketers, the supply chain controllers and distributors, and
the merchandisers. It does not necessarily matter where the manufacturing is done or where
the product is sold as long as most of the key stages of this process are controlled by you. This
is as relevant for Britain and Europe going forward out of recession as it is for the United
States. Similar sentiments have been expressed by other notables, such as Sir James Dyson,
the vacuum cleaner inventor/entrepreneur ("The only way we'll compete internationally in the
future is by owning ideas. We can't manufacture everything here—certainly not consumer
electronics. China and India are too dominant.") Brian Groom, Balance and Power,
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 22, 2010, at 7.
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Ignore the Spring 2009 British Airways strike—labor relations are
relatively good, nothing like in the 70’s;
The separateness from the Euro has its advantages—especially now;
The currency has fallen, making it more competitive;
Deficit reduction measures will have an impact;
And not insignificantly, London remains the bustling financial and
commercial center of Europe, some would say of the world—something
which will not change anytime soon.45

Longer term, therefore, under a broader-based and thus more flexible, less partydriven, government than old “New Labour” could provide, the future for the United
Kingdom may not be all that grim, even though, particularly in the short-term, there
will inevitably be some challenging economic hurdles to overcome. Indeed, a very
recent Economist article has focused upon how David Cameron and his coalition
government have now become the closely-watched “guinea-pig” of the industrialized
nations by virtue of their implementation of a group of radical initiatives.46 The
measures include reducing the budget for all major government departments, except
the National Health Service, by twenty-five percent (so that the budget deficit,
previously running at the inherited rate of 14% of GDP, is projected to drop to 2.1%
by 2014-2015).47 At the same time, the Cameron government will initiate a progressive decentralization of big government and loosening of State controls, with more
citizen volunteers taking on leadership roles in areas such as schools, the health
service, police, and crime.48 These ambitious programs are being pushed through on
a priority basis, and world leaders will be watching closely to gauge the impact and
success of such initiatives, including the crucial question of their impact in either
stimulating or curbing overall economic recovery.49
VI. EUROPE LOOKING FORWARD
One thing that I believe history teaches us is that a crisis or disaster of some kind
often leads, in its aftermath, to the birth of something more positive and creative than
existed before, usually with the objective of reducing the likelihood of a recurrence
of the disaster. So it was with the Magna Carta, the United Nations, and a myriad of
other examples.
In the wake of the economic crisis, with respect to Europe, it is to be hoped that
something similar will occur with regard to the three major questions and challenges
that I have previously identified:
1.
2.

Financial and banking system reform (and its interplay with
government);
An EU mechanism for handling member troubles.

45

See generally Out of the Ruins, supra note 39, at 14.

46

The Unlikely Revolutionary, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 14. 2010, at 19.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 20-21.

49

Radical Britain, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 2010, at 9.
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A longer term recipe for preventing the aging powers of Europe from
declining in commercial and industrial competitiveness on the world
stage
A. Regarding Banking System Reform

Not surprisingly, the financial crisis spawned widespread criticism and antipathy
toward the banking industry. A few days before that same mid-December 2008
morning that I arrived at Heathrow, Newsweek writer Daniel Gross, in an article in
Slate Magazine, had dubbed Royal Bank of Scotland head Sir Fred Goodwin as "The
World's Worst Banker."50 Not surprisingly, by the time I landed and for some time
thereafter, even the quality British newspapers were having a field day with this
epithet.51 Of course, the British press does not usually mince words, but ever since
that time, governments have been working towards some form of coordinated
international framework of banking industry controls designed:
1.
2.

To avoid a repeat of the same conditions which led to the crisis;
To provide some sort of payback for the losses caused.

Notably, as it has regained its nerve over time, the financial industry has become
less submissive and more emboldened in its resistance to reform (this is true on both
sides of the Atlantic), and financial reform packages are still being finalized. However, it is probably safe to say that such reforms will include:
•
•
•
•

Minimum capital requirements;
Limitations on the length of debt guaranties;
(Will likely include) curbs on the sizes of bank executive bonuses;
(May include) some form of payback mechanism.

These reforms became (and still are) a major focus among European leaders and
finance ministers. As an indication, on April 7, 2009, the Financial Times reported
that Gordon Brown “made numerous calls over Easter trying to build international
support for a tax that would reflect the debt banks owed to society.”52
B. Regarding EU Reform Needs
What has been exposed, particularly in relation to the current Greek crisis, is the
need for a more definitive framework of mechanisms or procedures to handle
problems arising in individual member countries. For this to occur, the EU will be
charting new ground. The lack of definition is not without precedent, however. The
new positions of EU President and Foreign Minister, which came into being with the
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, are not well-defined. For example, how
does the new EU President interface with the sitting EEC President in Brussels? If
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the position is intended to be mainly as a figurehead or ceremonial, then why did
Merkel and Sarkoczy make absolutely sure that Tony Blair did not get the job? The
answer is likely that they did so because they feared he would turn it into a position
that outshone and effectively outranked them on the world stage.
Therefore, the EU is without a firm mechanism to address situations like the
Greek financial crisis. As a Financial Times editorial recently stated—it is basically
"a body of fractious finance ministers.”53 When the Greek crisis erupted, for weeks
the EU leaders went back and forth on how to deal with Greece. Most envisaged
some sort of collective EU bail-out or rescue package, but, Merkel and Germany, in
particular, were adamant that Greece should seek assistance first from the free
markets and the IMF. 54 The subsequent decision and actions taken by the European
leaders reflected that the Merkel view appears to have prevailed. The 110 billion
euro loan rescue package from the IMF (primarily) and the euro-zone combined with
the major reforms demanded in return for the loan, appear to have stabilized the
Greek economy, at least for the time being. The impact has been fundamental. One
executive of a major Greek banking group was recently quoted as saying, "[w]hat is
happening here is a revolution. Things are happening now that should have happened
30 years ago."55 Nonetheless, the ultimate results remain in doubt. According to
another Greek official, "[i]t's a bit like bungee-jumping. It's very exhilarating but
you're in that moment when you don't quite know whether you'll hit the bottom or
come up again."56
This is probably what should have happened. After all, the IMF is in the business
of bailing out nations financially. However, all the while there has been uncertainty
because there is no set mechanism or process for dealing with a situation like this, as
the result of which the European financial community has lost confidence, and the
value of the Euro has declined. There is no question that serious structural reforms
are needed to deal with market laggards, such as Greece and Spain, and development
of an established framework and set of protocols to deal with crises such as the
recent emergencies is necessary. To date, initiatives have met with little success. As
one leader, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, said in 2007, “[w]e all know what to
do, but we don’t know how to get re-elected once we have done it.”57
That being said, however, forward-looking thinkers in Europe are already
focused upon examining innovative ways to address Greek-like sovereign credit
problem situations. Companies and individuals can have bankruptcy restructuring
procedures, so why not countries too? Thus, Germany has recently initiated talks
within the euro-zone on creating a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. While
these discussions are preliminary, they may very well lead somewhere. The Financial Times on August 2, 2010, pointed out that Anne Kruger, former second-incommand at the IMF, and economics professor at Johns Hopkins School of
International Studies, had proposed such a mechanism for Argentina a decade or so
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ago, and emphasized her opinion that “[i]n the case of Greece, a restructuring
mechanism might have avoided the damaging period between January and May this
year when the markets were heavily marking down Greece's debt but euro-zone
authorities were in denial that anything was seriously wrong.”58
There is still a long way to go before a codified, chapter 11-style sovereign debt
restructuring procedure is likely to emerge, but at least in the EU there is ongoing
thought development along the right lines.
Structural reforms will have to address some challenging circumstances: A Spain
in which forty percent of youth are unemployed;59 a Britain in which only fifteen
percent of households have a discernable breadwinner; a Belgium in which just
thirty-five percent of citizens between fifty-five and sixty-four still work;60 a culture,
especially in the southern European countries, in which income reporting for tax
purposes bears little relation to actual work (such as the Greek municipality where
the average home value is $2.5 million and the average declared taxable income is
$12,000); and an overall EU population in which the working-age labor force will
shrink by 20 million by 2030 while the number aged over sixty-five will increase by
40 million.61 As a recent Economist article stated: “Some of Europe’s most stubborn
structural problems involve the misallocation of public spending. Governments have
spent years padding civil-service payrolls, unveiling benefits like baby bonuses or
early-retirement payments just before elections, and shoveling subsidies to
politically powerful interest groups.”62
Following the unkind spring of 2010, however, there were signs that European
leaders see the need to reform in order to survive. The EU Commission recently
announced plans to push through an EU-wide patent, valid in all twenty-seven
countries. Most countries, including Spain, have initiated austerity measures.
Governments such as Britain and the Netherlands have increased the retirement age
for state pension eligibility.63 As will be emphasized again in the section which
follows, strong leadership is required, with vision and imagination.64 That EU
leaders have made reform an absolute priority, is without question. Nonetheless, the
path to achieving consensual change will not be easy.65
C. Regarding Europe’s Long-Term Relationship on the World State
Europe, as most would agree, is at a critical point in its evolution. One set of
structural reforms are undoubtedly needed to address the EU’s ability to handle
specific member doldrums. Another wave of more fundamental, longer term
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changes, at both individual EU member and market levels, is needed if Europe and
its member nations are to maintain and enhance their position among the world’s
great societies and trading blocs.
It almost goes without saying that strong leadership, individually and collectively, by those at the helms of the major members, will be vital to steer a course that
will fundamentally affect the lives of Europe’s 260 million inhabitants for decades
and generations to come. There are many current bright spots in European
commercial achievement – some of Britain’s enumerated above, Dutch globalization,66 German industrial output, and the use of lower-cost manufacturing in Eastern
European countries by some of the large manufacturers in the Western European
powers.67 This latter development is rightly regarded as particularly significant if
Europe is to remain globally competitive:
The EU was once a cosy club of western European countries. Now 27strong, stretching from the Baltic to Cyprus and taking in ten excommunist countries, the union’s best justification may be as a means of
managing globalisation. For free-market liberals, the enlarged union’s
size and diversity is itself an advantage. By taking in eastern countries
with lower labour costs and workers who are far more mobile than their
western cousins, the EU in effect brought globalization within its own
borders. For economic liberals, that flexibility and dynamism offers
Europe’s best chance of survival.68
Flexible use of labor resources between and among member countries can help,
but it cannot paper over fundamental long-term problems and challenges. In the
U.S., the aging baby-boomer workforce will be replaced by utilizing in part a mostly
successfully-integrated immigrant population with equivalent skills, education, and
abilities. Most importantly, in sharp contrast to the major European countries, the
vast majority of these first or second generation workforce immigrants regard
themselves, first of all, as “Americans,” and only secondarily as members of their
country of origin. This ability to absorb relatively seamlessly endless streams of
immigrants as its own is one of the U.S.’s great and enduring, yet mostly unsung,
strengths. Of course, as a nation of immigrants, it has a distinct advantage. It is not
so easy for an immigrant from Senegal or Vietnam to feel French, or one from
Suriname or Indonesia to feel Dutch, just as it is difficult for most French or Dutch
nationals to look upon their former colonials truly as fellow countrymen. But, if, and
it is a big if, Europe is to remain fully competitive on the world stage, that is what
needs to happen. The major European nations have the ability to create younger,
well-motivated, and sufficiently skilled work forces to compete in the globalized
marketplace for many decades to come, as well as to find creative approaches to ease
through the problems by making sure that ageing skilled workforces are productive
and efficient in the meantime. Indeed, a very recent "CBS on Sunday Morning"
feature focused on that very issue at Germany's BMW manufacturing plants and how
imaginative efforts were being implemented to "improve productivity" and longevity
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in its more senior workforce segments.69 However, it will take vision and
imaginative leadership to attain the requisite goals, including the achievement of
fundamental changes in social thinking in those respective countries. This will not be
easy. The forward-thinking open market leaders of Europe already face a substantial
opposition camp comprised mainly of Europe’s still powerful left wing, the public
sector workers and their representatives, and much of the French political class. Each
of these groups sees global competitiveness as a danger to the maintenance of high
cost social welfare systems. They prefer a protected form of intimate capitalism,
often called “corporate-ism,” preserved among the EU members and within its
borders, like a protective shell. This is a recipe which can only spell enormous
trouble for Europe down the road.70
VII. CONCLUSION: EUROPE’S WATERSHED
So there it is. Europe is at a crossroads. The path ahead will come excitingly, yet
scarily. This would have been the case even if the economic crash of 2008 had not
occurred. However, those events have more sharply underscored both Europe’s
frailties and vulnerabilities as well as its strengths. The strengths can provide the
foundation for future greatness and prosperity. The vulnerabilities must be dealt
with; otherwise real progress cannot be made. As I hope the foregoing comments
and observations have made clear, these are epic times, and the writing of the
current, massively important chapter in European evolution is far from being
completed.
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